STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS

STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND DOUGLAS
FAIRBANKS ON 2 DECEMBER 1957 AT 1215 HOURS

F- "... speaking up at Oxford next week end. He said, 'I
respect George ... and I know him, I have great respect
for him. It*s terribly difficult to speak with two
different views from the same platform at Oxford University."

D- "George— did you see George?"

F- "Yes."

D- "I don’t know quite what George is driving at, you know,

I mean, what does all this mean. There was quite a—."

F- "I saw—."

D- "To-do here in the, I think it was in the Times ."

F- "Yes, I saw the •••, it was in the Times ."

D- "No, it was in the Post . I guess."

F- "There is one in the Times in the inside."

D- "In the Times . too, yes."

F- "Well, he* s spelled out his reasons. Like every view,

there are two sides to it. I think that there is something
to be said for considering a phase of what he proposes.

After all, certainly very few people know the subject
better than what he does."

D- "Yes."

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F- "And from all I can gather from people who know the

situation better than I do and I've been around the UN
a great deal the last few days and, as you know, traveling
around. It seems to me the Russians will fight only with
a threat to their satellites. That's the only thing
they'll fight over; in other words, I think they— I don't
think they'll fight over the Middle East or I don't think
they'll ever have any intention, myself—.”

D- "They don't want to fight now if they can possibly avoid
it.”

F- "Yes.”

D- "I don't know, some years hence it may be different but — .”

F- "Some years hence, but pol icy ^w£r&s I think it serves
their purpose to deny us the Middle East or compromise
us or embarrass the Middle East if they can—

D- "Sure."

F- "But there is no great urgency on acquiring it for themselves
in the same way because it's not a — ."

D- "They'd like to deny the oil to us; they think that would

weaken Europe a great deal, as it would. It wouldn't affect
the United States so much except that we would have to share
our oil with Europe and we haven't got enough to go around."

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"What did you think of that suggestion — I’ll just remind
you because with so many papers, you may not remember
where it's from or anything else that’s sent through,
dropped in, that— -instead of trying to reconcile our
differences on the basic policies but to start trimming
them down in little places and do it behind the scenes
first rather than a big open bef ore-the-world thing.

The first thing would be to call off the dogs in counter-
propaganda subversion in the Middle East and see how it
works for a year's trial; if we would stop attacking
their vital interests or pull in a bit that they would
venture to do the same and give it a year's trial, if
it didn't work, well, we'd go back to where we started.
That was—."

"Oh, I think there is a good deal in that. We're not—
they're much better equipped, as a matter of fact, with
their radio position in the Middle East than we. Radio
Cairo on the Arab side is by far the most potent voice
there is in the area and, after all, the great percentage
of the educated Arabs are Egyptians. It just happens to
be the case; I mean, you can't change that overnight.
Therefore, they are able to put on more effective programs,
by and large, than we are. I suppose in the radio field

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they have an advantage over us. They have from time to
time, they are very funny about that, they'll have a
most ... campaign and then all of a sudden they will
stop it. Then, you think, well, this is fine and then in
about two weeks, they'll start it again; you don't quite
know why they deny them one or the other."

"Well, they have hinted through— not Malik himself— -but
through his intermediary that they would like to have us
consider a behind-the-scenes, off-the-record, agreement
that they'll lay off if we'll lay off and give it a year's
trial and see how it works and take the pressure off
these areas because they say that—."

"What does that mean? That we would lay off— you're
talking about, say, about the Middle East now or are you
talking about broader -areas or just about the Middle East?"
"Well, they didn't specify. What they did specify was that
'we'll lay off the Middle East if you lay off our vital
interest.' Now, they didn't specify whether 'our vital
interest* was the Middle East or the satellite countries."
"If they mean that we'd have to stop all broadcasting of
all kinds to the satellites, that would be pretty tough."

"I don't think it was spelled out— I don't think they
would expect us to do that because that would become too
overt."

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■ ..... .

D- "Yes,"

F- "I think what they mean is take the sting out of it

and put forward purely cultural and that sort of thing,

and then they would stop trying to undermine us,"

D- "As 1 understand it, our broadcast now to Poland is
pretty much of that nature."

F- "I talked to the Polish Ambassador the other night to the
UN who is a very cultivated man and fellow who is a
Catholic and he allowed us how that our program is very
potent in Poland."

D- "Potent."

F- "Yes, he said he was — ."

D- "Yes, I think it has been, but I think it's been quite

careful; I mean, there has been no incitement to revolt

and I think we've stopped a good deal of the old kind of
attacks on Communism and so forth and so on, which just
alone I don't think are very useful. I think you've got
to— -and it would be hard to stop— if you did that, then
the people in the satellite countries would think, 'Well,
they've given us up. They've written us off for the time
being, they've reached a deal with the Soviet Union.'

The Middle East is another situation; I think that if we
could quiet down the Middle East from every angle, it would
be a very good thing."

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F- "They will want their quid pro quo, that's the trouble
with that."

D- "Yes, 1 don't think that would be an equal quid pro quo
really, just to have the Middle East against the whole
satellite area. We're not anxious to incite the satellites
to revolt, but we want to keep the sort of hope for freedom
alive there and the radio is one of the few ways of doing

it."

F- "I've got two difficult speeches to make in Chicago in

about two weeks time for the Council on Foreign Relations
where they're having a tremendous turn-up. Adlai is one
of the directors of it—."

D- "Oh, yes, I know that, I know that."

F- "And then another one that same night to a smaller group
that is off-the-record. My problem is to say things that
are interesting that is not — -go counter to policy and yet
say a few things which may be private ideas and separate
the two of them somehow."

D- "Well, I'm sure you can do it, it's not too easy."

F- "Oh, I'm sweating over it very hard."

D- "The Council oti Foreign Relations in Chicago is an eminent
body. I've known it for twenty-odd years. Who runs it
now?"

F- "Oh, I've got to — ."

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D- "Quincy Wright used to, Mr. and Mrs. Quincy Wright used to,

I don*t know who runs it but he used to—."

F- "I've got all the names in my briefcase, I've forgotten
their names. The tenor of the thing will be more or less
of a report; I was asked to make a report on the attitude
of our allies and supporters and of the neutral or
uncommitted countries towards us and why has it changed
and try and analyze and report on why has the confidence
in us lessened and what are the various views on how it
can be re-established and as former. That is the gist—."

D- "Of course, it differs a good deal from country to country.
Our relations with Germany have kept on and with most of
the members of NATO; there have been ups and downs with
France because of the Algerian question and Tunisia and
things of that sort. Our relations today with India, I
think, are better than they were a couple of years ago."

F- "But there is a sort of lessening of that sort of blind,
almost idolagous, following of everything that we say
must ... be right—."

D- "Oh, yes, I don't know, do you think that ever really
existed?"

F- "At one time, we were the never-never land of hope and
glory —

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D- "Yes, well, that was unrealistic, you know."

F- "And now we've become human like the rest of them and
only just a little more powerful and richer than the
rest but just as human and just as capable of making
mistakes. There is, I think, a certain lethargy and lack
of enthusiasm growing."

D- "Well, it depends a little bit on, I wouldn't quite go-
take Italy, for example. Our relations with Italy are
better than they were two years ago on the whole, I think.
Some of the countries it is not the case; we've lost in
certain areas of the Middle East, no doubt. We've lost
in Egypt and in Syria."

F- "One of the Israelis was telling me the other night the
suggestion from the Israel standpoint, but he knows Arab
countries well that he's been there and speaks perfect
Arabic and he dines with them, he's friendly with them
behind the scenes, he castigates them in the ON but behind
the scenes, they dine together and are friends. The
suggestion that from the whole Middle East psychology
that if we were to continue to establish and even more
forcefully establish our identification with their eventual
welfare, not to take too seriously their sense of national-
ism because nationalism is purely a word without a plan.

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D-

F-

D-

F-

it hasn’t got a plan like in the more developed countries.
It’s a spark put out by leaders who play musical chairs
with each other— but that we would withdraw our physical
presence. We will say 'now, that opens us up to military
insecurity . 1 He was carrying on the argument that if we
withdrew to African bases, the security is just the same
because we could come in there just as quickly as the
Russians who were withdrawn, but that our physical presence,
although it has some advantages, has more disadvantages
from the standpoint of propaganda against us."

"I wonder what he means by physical presence? Where, for
example? The only base we have, and that’s not very much
of a base, is Dhahran. That doesn’t worry anybody very
much because it way out there in the desert and has no
effect on population, I mean- —

"Whether he meant the moving in of the fleets and the
show of physical power on their shores or not, I would/to
say — I may be putting words into his mouth."

"Yes, that was only done on one occasion when things
looked pretty ... in Jordan — ."

"There’s the threat of it, the sense that we’re prepared
to interfere there rather than — ."

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D- "We're the ones that haven't, the British and French
interfered in Egypt—,"

F- "Well, he has the same thing to say about them as well."

D- "And we've had no troops— we've put no troops in anywhere.
We've sent very few arms, we sent some arms to Jordan but
there isn't much American physical power presence right
in the Middle East. As I say, we've got an air base in
Dhahran but I've never heard anybody worry about that,
it's way out there, it doesn't effect the people at all.

We have no other air bases except for Turkey, of course."

F- "No, he was excluding Turkey in his talk — ."

D- "Yes."

F- "He meant the Arab and Israel thing if we — whether he
meant that more negotiations could be done between them
by indirection rather than direction by ...—•"

D- "We're trying to leave now, on this Israel i-Egypt i an thing,
more and more to the countries themselves; I mean, you've
got Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Jordan and Lebanon all feel
more or less alike about it. We're still playing around
with Egypt; that hasn't been written off finally, you know,
and no reason to write it off. The Syrian thing is quieter
than it was because they're having their own troubles
internally and there are two groups in Syria that are
beginning to contend inside Syria so that—."

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F- "Of course, if the present group in Syria get thrown out,
the Russians can say that we’ll say that we’ve done it,
of course,, I suppose that’s the rebuttal of that whether--*"

D- "Well, you’d have to throw out about three groups if you
throw them out now; I mean, there are two or three
different — ."

F- "Did you read Sulzberger this morning in the Times ?"

D- Yes, I’m kind of irritated at it. You know, these

columnists — I would just like to give them about five

minutes responsibility. There is not a concrete suggestion

in there. I know Cy very well, but I really thought that

was a pretty irritating sort of thing. Do you ever see

dare

them come out with a plan? They don’t/come out with a
plan,"

F- "We used to say in my business that a critic is like a eunuch
he can tell other people how to do it but can’t do it
himself."

D- Yes, I read Cy. Writing like Jehovah from a mountain top
and there were quite a number of errors in the thing to
boot, but still—. Cy is a good fellow but they think,
they've got a pontificate and if they enjoy it, well and
good. I’ve forgotten it myself, I remember reading it."

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Well, I think the gist of it was a kind of inconsistency
in various places that we haven't —

"Should foreign policy be consistent necessarily?"

"I think—,"

"You can't—,"

I fhink that definitely there shouldn't be because
circumstances change the art of ,,, —

"*»» art or science and so forth. You have to ..."

"He starts talking that it should be changed but at the
same time, ,,,"

Yes, ,,, Well, the Question of unification of Germany
is largely in the hands of the Germans and the Germans
don’t want to unify on the present basis. You can't a
majority of the Germans, and they've voted again and again
these people like (Walter Lippman) , a great friend of mine
they want an entirely new German policy. How are you
going to get a new German policy? The German people don't
want it,"

"But are they voting at the moment? I go to Germany and
when I was there— I've been twice in Germany since I've
seen you, I think, about two or three weeks ago, I don't
know whether they are, at the moment, voting on the basis
of East-West German policy or voting for staying on the
right side for this moment,"

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0- M Well, I don't know, I don't know. How can you tell, how
can you tell, Cyrus—* .,,,«* --we were supposed to have
settled both Cyprus and Algeria,"

F- "Well, that's pretty silly,"

D- "Oh, well, you have to live with them."

F- "But the Germans, it seems to me, are so terrified of

war, more terrified than almost anybody, that with a little
push or a little more security in their own internal
economy, a little more independence of movement, they
might seriously threaten to withdraw either from NATO
or neutralize their position in order: (a) to be kept
out of trouble; and <b) , to settle the Eastern Germany
thing, I talked to a great many different kinds of
people who somehow or other always bring it up in a
conversation. If they are against that idea, they will
still acknowledge that it exists,"

D- "Well, I think that if you want to sell out to Russia,
there are a great many things you can do and if all of
Europe wants to become neutralized, which I think is a
sell-out to Russia, it's just what Russia wants—.”

F- "I think so, too, of course it is."

D- "That's their choice. Europe and the United States together
is a great deal stronger than Russia and I think we can

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maintain that position. I think we're getting panicky.

There is no reason in the world why we can't maintain that
position and why Europe should say, 'All right, now,
we'll be neutralized' —which means they're at the mercy
of anything that Russia wants to do."

F- "Somehow or other—."

D- "We're not going to go to the support of a neutralized
Europe."

F- "Naturally not."

D- "You can't—.”

F- "But somehow or other— they * ve got an idea which someway
or other we must counter, is that the basic row is between
us and the Russians and that they are not really basically
involved in it and what they must do is to-- now, that
is not yet a majority opinion but it exists—."

D- "Yes, I think that’s got to be countered in a way because—."

F- "Somehow or other we failed to identify ourselves with
them. They feel that we have identified them with us.

You see what I mean?"

D- "Yes, I think there is a good deal in that and I think

maybe this NATO meeting ought to address itself to that."

F- "I'm trying to spell that idea out in my speech but I
haven't yet found the words of saying it."

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"Yes, I think that that*s a—,"

"Simply and directly but I think that that is one of
the—."

"It*s very important because if they don't want this,
if they don't want to maintain their own individual strength
but look at France, going into atomic weapons now— they've
got the choice and if they reach that decision, that is
their decision and there is nothing for us to say about
it. I don't think the majority of the Europeans have
reached that decision. They know the Russians, they know
what the Russians would do if they became neutralized.

What power would they have? What power of decision?
Everytime anything happened, Moscow would say, 'Well,
we'll turn on our guided missiles.' Well, if Europe
can say, 'All right, you turn on your guided missiles,
we'll turn on ours,' nothing happens. If the Russians
just say, 'We'll turn on our guided missiles,' and they
have no answer, but hope that we're going to come then
and fight their battle, I don’t know. I don't think the
majority of them yet want that."

"No, I don't think the majority do. All I'm saying is
that I have a feeling and impression which gains all the
time that that mood is growing rather than lessening.

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It s still a minority mood but even the majority who are
against it acknowledge its existance, fear it, and also,
when feeling in a argumentative mood, will put in an
occasional word here and there supporting it. H
Well, now, you take this last election in Germany where
the issue was up and where Adenauer, whom I know quite
well, and /Carlo Schmid/^ and others, they had that
program— that was really their program in many ways and
they made a miserable show of it. They had no real, it
was no real campaign; it wasn't a battle, it was a rout—.'
"But I don't think you—."

"Because, by and large, when you analyze the thing, it
doesn't make sense."

"Yes, but I don't think the German elections were decided
on that issue; I think they were decided on economic and
other issues. That was one of them which I think they—."
"Well, I don't know — there weren't any. What were the
great economic issues that were up? Of course, they had
a measure of prosperity, it's always easier, and they had
quite a forceful candidate even though he was pretty old.

I thought that was going to militate against him, it didn't
seem to. You go back — read the history of Europe of over
a century ago and you will find that times people took the
same attitude with regard to Russia as they are doing now."

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F- "Yes, exactly, exactly. And immediately following the
Napoleonic wars as well.**

D- "Yes. Of course, Europe cut itself all up, thereby,
laid itself open to Russia in two great wars,"

F- "Well, I don’t think that what we’ve done—."

D- "But you can’t over estimate the Russians greatly, you
know, you can't over estimate greatly,"

F- "No."

D- "Where they have put their minds to it where they have

gone into the guided missile thing, they’ve done extremely
well. But they still have a country where the standard
of living is deplorably low and they’ve been able to do
nothing about that yet because they've spent so much of
their progress on military. There is no indication that
the Soviet are prepared to cut down their military establish-
ment; they’ve dropped some of their ground forces off,
they wanted an excuse to do that anyway and have done it
voluntarily. Salzberger had the feeling of we've kind of
lost the battle to the Russians and that isn't the case,
you know,"

F- "In the same way as we've evolved basically a bipartisan
attitude to foreign affairs we vary, between the parties
on the method of application, but still we know what we’re
for and what we're against internally— if we can achieve

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that same thing as between the nations who are on our
side in that sense of participation, let us assume that
you are right insofar as the German question is concerned,
how can eliminate the fact that an opposition will feel
differently so that— in other words, to so persuade—."

D- "Well, you can't eliminate that, you can't do that, there
is always going to be differing views."

F~ "Well, except, let's say, when during the Hitler threat
which back in Paris it was less but which in its time was
great. There was unanimity on the part of — that was not
an issue between parties, everybody was against what they
recognized as a major threat."

D- "Yes."

F- "And they all felt in the same thing together. Now, the
parties in power in countries allied to us sympathize with
us, but there are sizable minorities and groups within
those countries who, maybe not be against us, but they
are not for us either; they sort of just leave us alone— a
real feeling that the row is between us and the Russians
and that they are not really involved. It doesn't help
anything to say that it's not true, but the point is that
we haven't convinced them that it's not true yet. Somehow
or other, we have not persuaded them that we’ve identified
themselves with us."

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D- "Yes, Of course, at the same time, Europe is terrified
that we'll run off and make a deal with the Russians
behind their backs."

F- "Of course they are, sure,"

D- "And any suggestion of bilateral discussions is anathema.
You'd think they'd say, 'Well, try to make a deal with
the Russians, that will be fine.' On the contrary, and I
think that goes to the opposition as well in most countries.
Take on this disarmament thing, the Russians are very
anxious naturally to talk with us. They say, 'You are
the real problem, let's get down together.' Well, if we
started that, there would be all hell to pay."

F- "I don't think disarmament will get anywhere until the
reasons for disarmament are reduced."

D- "That's always been the case, I worked on disarmament in
the 20s and the 30s. There hasn't been any real advance;
Harold Stassen made an awful good attempt."

F~ "Well, people arm as a result of fear. The point is to
eliminate or reduce the fear and then a disarmament comes
automatically whether there is a — ."

D- "Here we are now with the Soviet menace in the guided missile
field. Well, we've got to spend several billion more on

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guided missiles. We've had the lead in the nuclear field
and we still have it, but they're getting ahead of us in
the guided missile field apparently."

F- "Oh, I know what jfKennan' s,jf point was that if we, on the
NATO, with nuclear weapons, it will make it impossible for
the Russians to contemplate withdrawing from the satellites
because they won't entrust their satellites with nuclear
weapons; therefore, they will have to remain there in force
until we do— that's the gist of the thing."

D-

"Yes."

F-

"Well.

is there

any—?"

D-

"Well,

the other

countries aren't quite satellites, they

are going to look as though they are going to have them

anyway. The British have them now and they have means of

delivery by bombers. The French probably will have them,

they ought not afford it probably but they probably will

have them anyway; and, if the French have them, the Germans

will have them. So, are you going to give them no adequate

means of delivery, I mean, let them have the weapons but

If

not have the means of delivery? /They don't want these
things, goodness knows, we're not going to force them on
them. "

F- "No."

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"But the clamor on the part of the governments is to get
them and get them as soon as possible because then they
think they will have an answer to the Russians. If the
Russians threaten them with that they'll say, ’All right,
you do that and we'll do it, too.' I think in a way maybe
the salvation is that you will have this potential on
both sides which will be so staggering that neither side
could possibly win a war; that the damage that could be
inf 1 icted— and I think that's getting more and more so
with the guided missile. And we've got to arrange to have
these guided missiles scattered around so there couldn't
be-- and I think that would be perfectly feasible. We
could have enough guided missile bases, it would be utterly
impossible to knock them out all in half an hour or someth!
of that kind. Then, your retaliatory force can be so great
that the other fellow just can't risk it. If the Europeans
go along with that, then you'll have a senseof great
advantage over the Russians because you'll have a great
network there and we'll be much nearer to them than they
are to us. Not nearer to Europe, Europe would be just as
near to them as they are to Europe but we'll have that
advantage for the benefit of all. I don't think it is
any time to adopt neutralism as an answer.”

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F- "Certainly not, but the point is how are we going to

counteract it, that's ray argument. It's no time but it
is growing partly out of fear, partly out of this thing
in the dark, partly out of ignorance —

D- "Well, is it growing? Now, I wonder whether as it

was two or three years ago,"

F- "Well, I certainly would hesitate to —

D- "You're over there and you see it."

F- "Well, I'd certainly hesitate to debate anything in this
department where certainly more knowledge comes in than
anything I—."

D- "Oh, no, no, it's interesting. It may be, I'd like—."

F- "I can only report an impression gained rather than— can
I borrow a match from you?"

D- "Oh, excuse me, are there any matches in there? Some of
them have none."

F- "Yes, yes."

D- "That is one?"

F- "That is one that has some."

D- "Some— one isn't some. Let's take a complete one. There
is no doubt, you've got a problem in England that it is
very possible, I suppose you would say it is probable,
that if there were elections, the Labor Party would come

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think he would like to get— be more responsible. I think
there is, on the part of a lot of people throughout, even
responsible people who publicly are on our side and
privately another way. Their own pride, national pride,
steps in the way and that they are becoming stooges of
ours somehow or other; again, coming back to that somehow
or other, where I don*t really know, is that we have
failed to convince them that we are identified with their
problems rather than we are making them — the US has got
to be protected ... UN—,"

D- "Yes, I think you're very right on that. It ought not to
be portrayed as a struggle between the United States and
Russia because if we wanted to make a compromise at the
expense of the rest of the world, we probably could make
a fairly good compromise. I don't think it would last
or be good for any length of time, but we have no intention
of doing anything of that sort."

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F- "Well, subordinate partners know they are subordinate
partners and, unhappily, some way or other, they can
quote chapter and verse on how they are sometimes made
to feel they are subordinate and they say, *We know it
ourselves, we don't have to be reminded."

D- H I know it. That's very bad# I've always had the idea
that Europe wou Id become a kind of an equal third force.
Europe— Free Europe is a country of two hundred million
people, more people than we have in the United States,
and by and large, its level of intelligence and competence
and so for and so on are equal. They haven't got quite
the raw resources but still, with Africa and if they
handle Africa right, they could have all that, too. So,
there isn't any reason why, theoretically, you couldn't
build up a Europe, plus such resources in Africa, as an
equal third force in this picture which would be a marvelous
thing. Because, by and large, it would be on our side,
but not be on our side from the point of view of hanging
on to our coattails. We'd have an independent view of
things. That, we could live with, you know, and that
would be fine and then we'd have— because vis-a-vis the
Russians, we'd always really stand together."

F- "Yes* If we can somehow get that thought through, which
I think we are trying to do but somehow or other, it comes
out wrong on the other end."

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D~ "Yes, I think you're right because I think, so far, we

have to deal with each one individually and then it becomes
a question of their individual problems. In France it's
Algeria, it’s Tunis, it*s so forth and these problems —
but even if we don't have the relationships with MacMallin
and with Selwyn Lloyd and the present British Government,

I think it would be very good—."

25X1

F- "Very good indeed."

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D- "Yes. I know him well from his time over here. Tell me,
how long are you going to be over here? What are your
plans?”

F- ”Well, I'm just down in Washington today to see you and
the Navy this afternoon, Lewis Strauss, and I go back to
New York and I'll be there until the 21st."

D- "By the way, I've mentioned to Lewis that you and I were
in touch—."

F- "Oh, fine."

D- "And that I'd seen you on this trip and so forth and so

am H

on.

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D- "I think you’ll find no trouble there.”

F- "How do you remember all those little things? How do

you detatch that which you know everybody knows from the
papers and that which you know that nobody else knows?

Isn’t that a constant problem?"

D- "Well, it is but, I don't know, it’s just something that—."

F- "I remember FDR used to be the most insecure fellow in

the work because he could never separate what he knew and
what everybody else knew,"

D- "Of course, my difficulty is that you go out to dinner —
and it's terribly difficult to tell what you've read in
the newspapers and what you’ve read in the most secret
telegrams. You read a lot in the T ime s and the Tribune
and half a dozen papers—."

F- "That's where FDR used to drop bricks all the time.
Mountbatten used to do it, too,"

D- "I know, that's the hard thing."

F- "He used to talk about operation code names right out loud in
front of everybody. Everybody was just shivering, you
weren't supposed to even breathe the name of it, of the
operation, and he'd drop and catch himself. It seems often
the higher you are, the more insecure you are."

D- "It's difficult."

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D- "This is out in Chicago?"

F- "In Chicago."

D- "When do you do that?"

F- "On the 17th."

D- "17th of December."

F- "Yes."

D- "I will."

F- "I've got two speeches to make: one at lunch, the big one;
and then an off-the-record one at night. Any trial balloons
that you can wash your hands of later on and can say,*I
don't know anything about it,' I'd be very glad to weave
it in because it generally follows the policy."

D- "I was going to get you to talk to — ."

F- "And if you get any other—."

D- "I hope to get to New York on— I'm going to be up there
for a bit, let's see, a week from today I'm going to be
in New York, I hope to be. I don't get up there ouch, I
wish I could."

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F- "Will you be up there just for one day or — ?"

D- "I'm going to get off Sunday at noon and I've got to stay
over for dinner Monday night, that's about all."

F- "Oh, I'll be down in Georgia, I don't get back until
Tuesday,"

D-

F- "No, I'm director of Script© Ballpoint Pen—."

D- "Oh, really?"

F- "And I have to earn my keep as director from time to time
and raise the stock back and show up at an occasional
board meeting."

D- "Well, that was an amusing trip we had, wasn't it? It was
great fun, I enjoyed it —

F- "Great fun, I saw—."

D- "To meet you both and get to know you, it was really great
fun. Stavros was down here the other day."

F- "He's in New York now. I'm going to have dinner with him
tomorrow."

D~ "He's in New York and Janie is there and they're going to
open their— I'm afraid I’m going to miss their art show."

F- "I think it's tomorrow or the next day I'm supposed to go,
I don't know whether I can or not."

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D- "I'd like to see it. I, unfortunately, have got to go
out to lunch. I had a lunch — I wanted you for lunch but
I had this lunch before I--.”

F- M Well, you’re awfully kind to have given me so much time
and forgive me for being —

D- M Now, don’t talk that way. I wonder if General Cabell is
in. Do you know General Cabell?"

F- "May I call Sherman Adams? He asked me to call when I — •

D- "Sherman is in Europe,"

F- "Is he?"

D- "He’s in your home town, I think. He’s in London."

F- "He sent a cable and said call me when you get in town."

D- "Well, I don’t think Sherman can possibly be back--."

F- "Well, this was about two weeks ago when I knew that I
was coming down here when he said that. Sherman Adams."

D- "Oh, Sherman Adams? Oh, excuse me, I thought you said
Sherman Kent."

F- "No, Sherman Adams."

D- "Do you want to call him?"

F- "Well, his secretary. He just said to call when I leave
you. He's a great fellow."

D- "Are you lunching with him?"

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F- "No, he just told me to call when I leave you just to
see what my plans were* 1*11 talk to his secretary*

Thank you very much."

D~ M I can give you a glass of milk* That's all I'm going
to take.”

F- "No, that's fine. I’ve got a luncheon at the Metropolitan
Club* I'm going over now and see ..."

D- "An old friend of mine. I've been a member since— for
35 years now*"

F- "No. You know who put me up was Bill (Castle). Do you
remember him?"

D- "Oh, do I— oh. Bill is around, you know. He's alive and
kicking."

F- "Is he?"

D- "Oh, yes* Bill is a great fellow."

F- "Is his wife still alive, do you know?"

D- "Yes, Margaret is still alive and going strong."

F- "She was very ill a couple of years ago*"

D- "She is a great deal thinner than she used to be; of course,
she could get thinner, you know."

F- "Yes, she could."

D- "Well, she is. She doesn't look at all well but she's going
strong. Have you transportation?"

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F - M I have outside.**

D- "You have."

F- "Yes, thanks very much, yes. I have a friend who has been
acting as chauffeur. Allen, it was grand to see you and
let me know if there is anything between now and the 17th
and 1*11—."

D-

F-

D-

F-

D-

"I will, I have your address in New York?"

"Yes, and anything else— when I go back over to the other
side, 1*11 probably turn around and come back here in the
end of January or February."

"Oh, you will? Well, it was very interesting to get your
views. There is a lot in— I understand what you say."
"I'll send you a copy of the various speeches — ."

"I don* t feel as discouraged as some people do, you know.
There are a lot of problems but they've got a lot of
problems, too, and to think what Kr. Khrushchev has on
his mind— it's always well to think of that, you know.

You might put a little of that in your speech. He's got
to re-organize the industry of his country, he's got to
try to run now— 'this socialized industry, when it gets as
big as it is getting to be, it's very very hard to manage.
When it's small and growing and growing ahead, but when

— 35 —

yH'T

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i

i, ...n 1

your problems begin and you get short of personnel here
and laborors there and managers here and so forth and so
on and get them all scrambled around and you've got
agriculture on your hands and if you have a bad crop,
you know, you*ve just had it."

F- "Remember we talked once about what is the origin of
policy, how is that done?”

D- "Yes."

F- "So, I've sort of being snooping around for opinions on
that and I don't presume or suppose that it's anything
you— -and it still doesn't answer the question, but all
the answers came up the same that I got from those who
should know — ."

D- "Yes."

F- "Which is that — it's surprising how much is that to just
ordinary human discussion around a group of sixteen, that
they will comment and idea will be put forth and sometimes
on the spur of the moment and then .... sent down to be
studied and then be sent back up again."

D- "Yes."

F- "But I don't suppose that's a particularly—."

D- "They have a pretty good policy apparatus there in the

Soviet, there's no question about that. That works pretty
well."

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